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‘Writes a fair hand and appears to be well
qualified’: the recruitment of Bank of England
clerks, –
ANNE L. MURPHY
University of Hertfordshire
The financial strains of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars had a significant impact on the Bank of
England. In its position as banker to the state and manager of the state’s debt, it experienced a significant
increase in workload and thus was forced rapidly to expand its workforce. From a complement of around
 in the mid s, the number of clerks employed had increased to over  in . Using a unique
set of records preserved in the Bank’s archives, this article investigates the backgrounds and skills of
the men recruited during the expansion of the early nineteenth century. It finds a significant gap
between the skills required by the Bank and the skills possessed by its potential workforce.
Keywords: banking, recruitment, human capital, skills
JEL classification: N, N
By the end of the eighteenth century the Bank of England was firmly entrenched as
banker to the state and manager of the state’s debt (Bowen ). Thus, as the rising
costs of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (–) put pressure on
Britain’s financial systems, the burdens placed on the Bank increased. Aside from
the additional financial support it offered to the state, the stresses on the Bank man-
ifested most clearly in increases in its workload. In its position as primary manager of
the public debt, it had to cope with rising numbers of public creditors demanding
prompt attention when they wished to sell or purchase government stocks or
collect their interest payments and dividends. Throughout the war period, the
Bank had also to manage a vastly increased discounting business. As Clapham
notes, the average amount of bills of exchange discounted had only been a little
over £. million in  but by  it was over £ million per annum
(Clapham , II, p. ). Perhaps most problematic for the Bank was the
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management of its banknotes after  when, as a means of protecting its gold
reserves, the Bank suspended the convertibility of its notes. The suspension resulted
in a significantly increased note issue and extended that issue, for the first time, to small
denomination notes (Clapham , II, p. ; Newby ). One of the unintended
consequences was a rising tide of forgery. The newly issued £ or £ notes were a
magnet for criminals, but the peculiarities of the eighteenth-century legal system
made the Bank not only victim but also detective and prosecutor. This required
a significant operation to manage not only note issue but also identification of
forgeries and detection and prosecution of the forgers (McGowen , ;
Wennerlind ).
The result of this rapid expansion of the Bank’s various businesses was an urgent
need to increase its workforce. From a complement of around  in the mid
s, the number of clerks employed had increased to over  in  (Giuseppi
, p. ; Kynaston , I, p. ). This undoubtedly made the Bank’s staff the
largest concentrated white-collar workforce in the world. Much like a civil service,
together the Bank’s clerks constituted a body of knowledge and experience that
remained constant while directors and governors of the Bank came and went. Each
operated in a specialised capacity in offices supervised by senior colleagues, and
heavily coordinated with each other, thus making the organisation of work at the
Bank akin to that in a large factory. Individually, the jobs those clerks performed
were mundane and repetitive but collectively the feat they achieved, that of managing
the national debt and providing banking and discount facilities for London’s business
and financial community, was nothing short of extraordinary. Moreover, this was a
labour force that, until the advent of the typewriter and the automated bookkeeping
machine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and indeed, arguably
until the advent of the computer, could not be replaced or even significantly aided
by technology. Their work was done by hand in processes that involved the
endless recording of details in ledgers and checking and double-checking to ensure
the integrity of the records.
Although the skills of London’s financial workforce have been acknowledged in
recent studies, little attention has been given to the development and quality of
those skills (Cassis ; Michie ). Perhaps because of a scarcity of sources, the
classic studies of banking development and the institutional histories of individual
banks have given little space to the work of the clerks (Akrill and Hannah ;
Checkland ; Crick and Wadsworth ; Pressnell ; Sayers ). Nor
indeed has the eighteenth-century emergence of the white-collar worker com-
manded the attention of historians. Indeed, McKinlay dates the emergence of the
‘banking career’ as late as the  years prior to  (McKinlay ). Even when
they have been considered, early clerks have been characterised as a ‘marginal
group’ (Heller , p. ). In consequence, most of the historiography has concerned
itself with the lives of Victorian clerks, especially during the later nineteenth century
when their lifestyles and status supposedly came under threat from a rapidly expanding
potential workforce, the seeming downgrading of the status of clerical labour and
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eventually the influx of women into clerical work (Anderson , ; Heller
; Lockwood ; Orchard ).
This article offers an insight into a much earlier set of white-collar workers through
an examination of the backgrounds and skills of the men interviewed by the Bank of
England between  and , a period when both it, and the banking sector more
generally, was undergoing significant expansion (Pressnell , p. ). It draws on a
unique set of sources preserved in the Bank’s archives. These include ledgers contain-
ing details of the initial interviews with applicants for clerical positions. The ledgers
covering the period from  and  include  interviews with  unique indi-
viduals:  sons of former and current clerks and menwith no familial connection
to the Bank. Although the exact details recorded during each interview differed, the
ledgers generally recorded some standard information, notably place of birth, age,
religion and marital status. Candidates were also asked to confirm that they were
free from debt and that they did not belong to any associations, such as political
clubs. In many cases candidates provided information about their schooling and pre-
vious career histories. Some also gave details about their families, including their
father’s or mother’s occupation. The interview ledgers can also be cross-referenced
with separate ledgers in which were recorded the results of tests performed by each
applicant. Not all candidates can be traced in these ledgers but test results can be
found relating to nearly  of the  interviews thus offering a significantly large
sample from which to draw conclusions. Together the two sets of ledgers allow
the construction of a detailed picture of the labour force available to the early nine-
teenth-century Bank of England.
The men who emerge through these records may have been a marginal group
when measured against the rest of London’s, and indeed Britain’s, early nine-
teenth-century workforce (Lindert and Williamson , p. ), but they were
highly significant at a point where sound management of the national finances was
key to British military and geopolitical success. Trust in public finance and a newly
established paper currency rested largely upon the efficient functioning of the Bank
and thus ultimately on the shoulders of the Bank’s clerical workforce. This article
is the first to explore this aspect of the functioning of the fiscal-military state and
also the first study of early nineteenth-century white-collar workers. What follows
will firstly explain the Bank of England’s recruitment process. Section II will discuss
the clerks’ backgrounds. Sections III and IV will focus on skills, considering the
broad scope of skills to be found among the potential workforce and the results of
the Bank’s tests of its applicants. Section V will consider the means used by the
Bank to bridge the obvious gaps between the skills it required of its workers and
those possessed by applicants for its posts. Finally, section VI concludes.
I
Employment at the Bank of England was attractive. The Bank offered a regular salary
that compared very favourably with other similar work and was paid quarterly in cash,
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something that was not always available to other workers (Boot , ).1 By 
it was also acknowledging that it was impossible to get by on less than £ per
annum and, therefore, it supplemented salaries that fell below that point through gra-
tuities that could be earned by diligence and regular and timely attendance (Acres
, II, p. ). Pay could be further enhanced in some offices by payments for over-
time, bonuses paid by the Bank, and gratuities from grateful customers. Over the long
term, earning potential was very good with salaries rising in regular increments once
an initial, and informal, training period had been completed. The taking of a second
job was also permitted so long as it did not interfere with work at the Bank (Acres
, II, p. ). Moreover, although there were some redundancies after the conclu-
sion of the NapoleonicWars, for the most part, work at the Bank offered job security.
The Bank’s directors allowed clerks to work well into their old age. It also granted
generous pensions to those who it let go or who wished to retire and to those who
were unable to work through accident or physical or mental incapacity. A lifetime’s
career in the Bank of England would ensure a secure place in the middle to upper
middle ranks of society (Boot , p. ). For all these reasons, although, as we
shall see, there might have been a shortage of the precise skills required by the
Bank, each vacancy could certainly have been filled by a willing hand many times
over.
There was, however, no public advertisement of vacancies at the Bank. Men could
only be considered by recommendation of one of the directors or by virtue of being
the son of an already long-serving employee. It seems probable that many of the
directors had a fairly steady stream of young men making contact with them and
they chose the most promising, most well-connected, or the most pushy, of those
men to put forward when an opportunity presented itself. As such, access to a position
at the Bank, initially at least, was about who you knew, and howwell you were able to
exploit that connection, rather than what you knew. This was certainly typical of
employment practices in other similar businesses, such as insurance and the East
India Company (Bowen , p. ; Supple , p. ). But it does not mean
that employment practices were poorly considered or determined solely by patron-
age. The social bonds that determined introduction arguably acted as a strong
initial screening mechanism and, in the longer term, may have reduced the risk of
malfeasance. In industries like banking and insurance, therefore, personal recommen-
dation continued to be a common requirement for employment well into the twen-
tieth century (Anderson , p. ; Heller , p. ).
The Bank’s recruitment procedures had always been quite rigorous (Murphy
). From the early nineteenth century, however, procedures were enforced
with greater vigour. After  when it required additional hands, the Bank
appointed a committee from among its directors to interview the applicants. As an
introduction to the Bank each candidate was asked to prepare a petition outlining
1 Bank of England Archive (henceforth BEA), M/ Minutes of the Committee for House and
Servants, –, see, for example, fos. –; see also Schwartz , p. .
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his fitness for the position. Unfortunately, none have survived in the Bank’s archives
so the precise nature of these documents is not known. This also means that we have
little information about the reasons why the candidates had applied to the Bank,
except when the more unusual cases were noted in the interview record. Surely
Walpole De St Croix was somewhat ill advised in the claim he made in his application
that he wanted to give up his position because he felt himself aggrieved when his
current employer had docked his wages for being late to work a few times.2
William Smithyman was on equally shaky ground when he informed the committee
that service at sea for the East India Company had convinced him that he was ‘better
leading a sedentary life than an active one’.3 Those candidates whose reasons were not
deemed worthy of record must have instead emphasised the attractions of a steady
wage, long-term job security and the prestige of working for the country’s premier
financial institution.
On the day of the interview each candidate was subject to a test, conducted by the
chief accountant, of the candidate’s ability to deal with money, an interview with a
committee of the directors, and was then asked to provide a sample of his writing
and work with accounts in front of the committee. On completion of the interview
and testing process, the committee made their recommendations which then went
forward to the Court of Directors. The final decision to employ or reject rested
with them. Nonetheless, failure to secure employment at the first attempt was not
necessarily the end of the story. Many men made a number of applications to the
Bank, often working in the interim to repair any defects noted by the interviewing
committee.
Of those whowere rejected by either the committee or the Court of Directors, age
was one stumbling block. From  the Bank set a minimum age of  and a
maximum age of  for its applicants. Thus Frederic Reid was rejected at his first
attempt to enter the Bank because he was not yet .4 Some candidates were
found to be unqualified. Hence George Lettis who had worked as a warehouseman,
run the Spotted Dog public house in the Strand and then worked for six months for a
militia insurance office was ‘Disqualified from his want of ability and also on account
of the situations he has held’.5 Only one man was rejected because of a physical dis-
ability: Charles Burrows was found to have a serious speech impediment, so much so,
that he took his father to the interview to speak for him. His recommendation was
later withdrawn.6 Some men lost their chance by succumbing to anxiety. James
2 BEA, M/, Committee for Examination of Clerks: qualifications reports,  Jul.  –  Mar.
,  Mar. .
3 BEA, M/, Committee for Examination of Clerks: qualifications reports,  Jan.  –  Jul.
,  Dec. .
4 BEA, M/,  Mar. .
5 BEA, M/,  Nov. .
6 BEA, M/,  Jun. .
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Westerman, aged , from Kilkenny in Ireland was ‘so nervous that he could not
multiply a sum’. His name did not go forward to the Court of Directors.7
Overall, however, the rejection rate of applicants to the Bank was very low. Over
 per cent of the men interviewed during the period under consideration were
offered employment. Although giving the impression that the process lacked rigour
or was merely a rubber-stamping of favoured directors’ choices, as the following
section will demonstrate, the interview process was challenging. The low rejection
rate was, in fact, symptomatic of another factor: during this period the Bank was
expanding rapidly and the skills it required were in short supply.
I I
The details preserved in the Bank’s interview records allow us to construct a detailed
picture of the candidates who applied for positions. The average age of those with no
familial connection to the Bankwas . and the average age of those applicants who
were sons of former or current clerks was .. The age range of the applicants was
between  and . Those who were under-age at the time of initial interview were
usually invited to return when they were older. The upper age limit of  was some-
times relaxed. It is clear that the committees were aware of the possibilities of cheating
the system. William Gibbs was fortunate to be able to produce proof of his age as the
Committee noted that he looked unusually young.8 John Wall, apparently aged ,
was suspected of having altered his certificate to get past the Bank’s upper age limit.9
Nonetheless, there are a number of indications that age was difficult to prove, and
sometimes difficult to know, in a period prior to the introduction of compulsory
registration of birth. Thus, John Way, a Trinitarian, was unable to produce a
certificate of his age and had instead produced an affidavit signed by his father in
the presence of the Lord Mayor.10 This was not just a problem for dissenting
Protestants. Samuel Frame was unable to find the register of his birth despite
having looked through the books of several parishes.11
As Table  shows, the majority of applicants to the Bank were born in London and
the south-east suggesting, as might be expected, a largely regional market for clerical
labour. Nonetheless, there were also a number of applicants drawn from all over the
country and from farther afield. This should not surprise. The draw of London for
economic migrants, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and indeed
much earlier, is well established (Harding ; Wrigley ). London remained,
even by the early nineteenth century, the driving force behind Britain’s economy
and the place where the highest concentration and variety of jobs could be found.
7 BEA, M/,  Dec. .
8 BEA, M/,  Jan. .
9 BEA, M/,  Feb. .
10 BEA, M/,  May .
11 BEA, M/,  Jul. .
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London also drew in workers from outside Britain’s borders and thus the Bank
attracted candidates who had been born, grown up and even started their careers in
Britain’s nascent empire and other major centres of trade. Thus, applications were
received from men born in Hamburg, The Hague and Bruges.12 John Joseph
Blake was born and grew up in the East Indies.13 Cheney Hamilton and John
Robertson were both born in Jamaica.14 The candidate from farthest afield was
Henry Martin Johnson born in  in New Holland (Australia). Henry was the
son of Reverend Richard Johnson, the first clergyman to serve the new congregation
of convicts and their guards.15 Henry must have been one of the first European babies
to be born in Australia.
As might be expected of a cohort that included men in their late s and early s,
some of the men applying to the Bank between  and  were married and
many of those had children. Table  shows the marital status of the applicants.
There is no evidence that the Bank preferred married men, indeed the majority of
the applicants were single:  per cent of applicants with no familial connections to
the Bank and  per cent of the sons of former clerks. There are, however, some indi-
cations that the interviewing committees might have harboured doubts about the
Table 1. Place of birth of applicants to the Bank, –
Place of birth Non-sons
Number %
London  .
South-east of England  .
South-west  .
Midlands  .
North of England  .
Scotland  .
Ireland  .
Wales  .
Abroad (in colonies)  .
Abroad (not colonies)  .
Unknown  .
 .
Source: BEA, M/–, passim.
12 BEA, M/,  May ; M/,  Jun. , M/,  Jan. .
13 BEA, M/,  Jul. .
14 BEA, M/,  Jul. ;  Jun. .
15 BEA, M/, Committee for Examination of Clerks: qualifications reports,  Jul.  –  Feb.
,  Apr. ; Australian Dictionary of Biography, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/johnson-
richard-, accessed on  Mar. .
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stability of young, single men. Hence -year-old Henry Pownall’s father reported to
the committee that his son was ‘very steady and not inclined to Company’.16
As Pownall’s father’s assertion suggests, the ideal clerk was a man whose reputation
held no hint of poor behaviour, profligacy, temptation to fraud or embezzlement nor
indeed the likelihood of political or religious activism. All candidates were asked
about their religious and other affiliations that might have conflicted with their loy-
alties to the Bank in its own regard and as representative of the state. And all men were
questioned about their financial stability.
As Table  shows, the majority of men were of the established church. Various
denominations of dissenters were represented and their relatively high showing
among the sons of clerks suggests that the Bank did not discriminate against them.
On the other hand, there were no Catholic applicants to the Bank. This was
largely a reflection of demography. It has been estimated that by  only  per
cent of the British population was Catholic (O’Gorman , p. ). But the
Bank of England had also, on the discovery of a ‘Papist’ employee in , introduced
rules that prevented the employment of Catholics. There is no sign that the gentleman
in question, Thomas Macdonnell, was anything other than an exemplary employee
but with the Jacobite rebellions fresh in their minds, the Directors at the time were
clearly not taking any chances. Catholics subsequently were not considered for
posts within the Bank until after the Catholic Emancipation Bill of  (Acres
, p. ).
Men were also asked about clubs to which they might belong. This line of ques-
tioning probably emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution and particularly
with the rise to prominence of radical societies, such as the London Corresponding
Table 2. Marital status of applicants to the Bank of England, –
Marital status Non-sons Sons of clerks
Number % Number %
Single  .  .
Married, no children  .  .
Married,  child  .  .
Married,  children  .  .
Married,  children  .  .
Married,  children  .  .
Widower  .  .
Unknown  .  .
 .  .
Source: BEA, M/–, passim.
16 BEA, M/,  Jul. .
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Society, founded in . Unsurprisingly, no men in the sample preserved in the
examinations books admitted belonging to any political clubs although a couple
did note membership of friendly societies and Samuel Field confessed to being a
member of a card club that met once a fortnight in the Furnival Inn.17
Indebtedness was a different matter. Men who were at the time of the interview in
business for themselves were quizzed carefully about their credit-worthiness and the
stability of the enterprise. Thus Charles Russell revealed that he was making his living
as a bookseller and was married to awomanwho had two children from a former mar-
riage. He noted that, if offered the job at the Bank, his wife and her son would carry
on that business. Russell also revealed that he had around £ in demands against
him but book debts sufficient to meet those demands and a £ per annum
annuity from his wife. His account satisfied the committee.18 A number of men
admitted to being discharged bankrupts. William Smith Oakley had been in the
wool business with his father but they had been made bankrupt. Oakley could
produce his certificate of discharge.19 James Jackson had been a linen draper but
had become bankrupt with debts of £. He had managed to pay his creditors 
shillings in the pound.20 In considering the applications of discharged bankrupts,
the Bank was following English law, which granted bankrupts who fully cooperated
Table 3. Religion of applicants, –
Religion Non-sons Sons of clerks
Number % Number %
Church of England  .  .
Dissenting Protestant  .  .
Independent Dissenter  .  .
Quaker  .  .
Trinitarian  .  .
Unitarian  .  .
Baptist  .  .
Methodist  .  .
Presbyterian  .  .
Church of Scotland  .  .
Unknown  .  .
 .  .
Source: BEA, M/–, passim.
17 BEA, M/,  Mar. .
18 BEA, M/,  Feb. .
19 BEA, M/,  Mar. .
20 BEA, M/,  Jul. .
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with the Commission of Bankruptcy a full discharge of their debts and a small stipend,
thus allowing them to rebuild their lives (Kadens , p. ).
It is difficult to be precise about the social status of candidates. The nineteenth-
century view was that occupations recruited chiefly from ‘the children of those
already employed in it’ (J. S. Mill quoted in Leunig, Minns and Wallis , p.
). Studies focusing on earlier periods have drawn similar conclusions. They have
tended to argue that ‘options were restricted by parents’ resources and their networks
of acquaintance’ (Thomas , p. ) and that a clear tendency towards ‘occupational
inheritance’ existed (Mitch , p. ). The fact that so many sons of existing clerks
sought work at the Bank would also suggest that some vestige of a system of ‘occu-
pational caste’ was in operation. Nonetheless, the occupations of the parents of the
applicants with no familial connection to the Bank show significant diversity. The
interviewing committees recorded parental occupations in  cases, mostly relating
to fathers’ occupations, but mothers’ occupations were noted if the father was already
deceased. Among these individuals there were very few clerks. As Table  shows, the
remaining parents appear to have been drawn from the higher artisanal classes and
from the middling sorts but were engaged in varied occupations demonstrating that
occupational caste held relatively little sway in the clerical profession. This also
points towards conclusions reached by more recent studies of apprenticeships
showing that labour markets in skilled employment were not heavily constrained
by social barriers (Leunig, Minns and Wallis , p. ).
Because candidates were drawn from a range of backgrounds, sons of serving clerks
excepted, it is pertinent to ask what methods men used to get noticed by their nom-
inating directors. Although little specific evidence can be found, some routes were
obvious and it is possible to speculate about others. Naturally some directors nomi-
nated their own servants and clerks to positions in the Bank. Such was the case for
Thomas Wickstead, nominated by the director Mr Whitmore, who also gave
Wickstead a ‘very good character’.21 As was typical in recruitment to other similar
organisations, some candidates would have been introduced to directors through
third parties. Friends, business partners or acquaintances might have recommended
either their own employees or perhaps their sons or some other family member for
preferment (Makepeace , pp. –). Churches and non-conformist meeting
houses might have been another locus for making connections. There is also some
evidence of networks of patronage. Thus, of the  applicants with no familial con-
nection to the Bank,  had some connection to Reading. The Bank’s records also
reveal a director, Edward Simeon, with strong connections to Reading. It seems
likely then that it was known in the area that Simeon was willing to recommend
local young men for positions.
Although, potential clerks or their fathers did not necessarily move in the same
social circles as the Bank’s directors, another route to contact might have been
through an existing job. Men working in counting houses, banks or one of the
21 BEA, M/,  Jun. .
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Table 4. Occupations/social status of fathers and mothers of applicants grouped by sector ( m =includes mother’s occupation)
Occupation Occupation Occupation
Agent  Dyer  Ranger of books in Treasury 
Apothecary  Ensign  Rentierm 
Architect  Farmingm  Sadler 
Artist  Feather merchant  Schoolmaster 
Attorney  File maker  Sealing wax manufacturerm 
Auctioneer  Flatting mills  Ship builder 
Baker  Gauger  Ship chandler 
Banking  Grocerm  Ship’s captain/master 
Bill broker  Haberdasher  Shopkeeper 
Blackwell Hall factor  Hackneyman  Silk manufacturer 
Blanket dealer  Hair dresser  Silversmith 
Bookkeeper  Horse hair manufacturer  Smithfield agentm 
Bookseller  Hosier  Stationer 
Brewer  Housekeeperm  Steward 
Brick maker  Innkeeper  Stone mason 
Butcher  Ironmonger  Sugar cooper 
Butler  Lace makerm  Sugar refiner 
Carpenter  Land surveyor  Surgeon 
Cheesemonger  Leather dresser  Surgical instrument maker 
Clergyman  Linen draper  Surveyor 
Clerk  Magistrate  Tailor 
Cloth workerm  Master gunner  Tallow chandler 
Clothier  Mathematician  Tanner 
Coach maker  Mealman  Tea broker 
Coal trade  Merchant  Tobacconist 
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Table 4. Continued
Occupation Occupation Occupation
Coffee house proprietor  Musical instrument maker  Trainbearer to Speaker of House 
Collector of excise  Musician  Turner 
Confectioner  Navy packer  Upholsterer 
Conveyancer  Oilman  Victualler 
Counting house  Orchell maker  Waiter 
Custom house  Packer  Warehouseman 
Dentist  Pay master  Watchmaker 
Dissenting minister  Perfumier  Wheelwright 
Doctor  Picture frame maker  Wine merchant 
Doorkeeper  Post Office  Wool stapler 
Druggist  Potter  Wool trade 
Printer  Worker at the Mint 
Source: BEA, M/–, passim.
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government offices were likely to come into contact with one or more of the Bank’s
directors or their friends. But booksellers, haberdashers, clerks to wine merchants or
men working in one of the City’s coffee houses would also have encountered a wide
variety of people through their work and perhaps been noticed by or indeed found
the courage to talk their way into a better position. The latter strategy, of course,
was a risky one since it encompassed both the risk of rejection by the Bank and alien-
ation of a current employer. Such was almost the fate of William Thetford, who
applied to the Bank in . Thetford was dismissed by his previous employer ‘on
account of his application to be taken into the Bank’.22 Fortunately the story
ended happily, William and his brother John were both offered positions at the Bank.
The range of middling sort and artisanal backgrounds from which applicants to the
Bank were drawn points clearly to expansion of the clerical class at this time. This was
a necessary consequence of the need to meet the demands of the fiscal-military state.
For applicants this undoubtedly brought the advantage of somewhat lower entry bar-
riers to work at the Bank. For the Bank itself, this created more of a problem because,
as the following sections will demonstrate, there was a clear gap between the skills it
required and the skills available amongst the existing workforce.
I I I
Modern studies emphasise that formal education is an important factor in the devel-
opment of human capital (Becker ). Yet, the quality of school education available
at the end of the eighteenth and start of the nineteenth century was often inadequate
to the task of instilling the skills needed for clerical work. Traditional grammar schools
still concentrated on offering a classical education. A more ‘modern’ education might
have included English and mathematics perhaps with some attention to the human-
ities, foreign languages and those other socially valuable skills of drawing and dancing.
Commercial schools placed more emphasis on the skills that were required of Bank
clerks: being able to write a good hand and basic maths and bookkeeping. Yet, in
all areas of education, abuses and neglect were common and provision at secondary
and higher levels was generally poor (Langford , pp. –; Mitch , pp.
–). In consequence, only a very small proportion of the population would
have had more than a few years’ formal schooling (Wallis , p. ).
Nonetheless, most applicants to the Bank appear to have had a school education.
Only one man from the sample confessed to a university education. Ames Simon
Cottle received his bachelor’s degree fromMagdalen College, Cambridge. The com-
mittee recorded that his handwriting was ‘not fine’.23 Other candidates mentioned
specific schools such as the Blue Coat schools, Christ’s Hospital and Charterhouse.
Thomas John Jones had been educated at the Naval Academy in Chelsea.24 Scott
22 BEA, M/,  Dec. .
23 BEA, M/,  Sep. .
24 BEA, M/,  Sep. .
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Francis, aged , had been at a college in Rheins in Champagne for five years but had
been unemployed since his return to England a year previously.25 HenryWyburd was
the only candidate who mentioned being educated by a private tutor, undoubtedly a
more expensive option for Wyburd’s parents or guardians (Langford , p. ) but,
in this case, money relatively well spent. Wyburd was acknowledged to be quick at
figures and have the potential to improve his handwriting.26 John Dance had been
educated by his father, who did not do such a good job, Dance was noted as only
having ‘tolerable’ handwriting and being ‘middling’ at accounts.27
The questionable value of formal education during this period suggests that length
and level of schooling was not, and could not be used as, a reliable indicator of attain-
ment and ability by the Bank’s interviewing committees. It was perhaps for this reason
that, as we shall see, such a great emphasis was placed on the testing of applicants. It
was perhaps also a reason why so few men applying for a position at the Bank of
England were embarking on their first position since leaving school. Indeed, given
that the average age of candidates was around  among men with no familial con-
nections to the Bank and around  among sons of clerks, this suggests prior work
experience of between three and seven years, assuming a school leaving age of
around  or .
Although evidence is not plentiful, the Bank of England does appear to have
been unusual in preferring to recruit men with work experience. Bowen’s study
of the East India Company, for example, suggests some candidates for employ-
ment were often just  or  years of age (Bowen , p. ). Sayers also
emphasised the employment of school leavers at Lloyds Bank (Sayers , p.
). Checkland noted the use of an apprenticeship system in the Scottish
banks from the early nineteenth century, with the National Bank at least stipu-
lating that its clerks should be no younger than  but no older than  years of
age (Checkland , p. ). In other public banking systems too, younger
men were preferred. The starting point for workers in the public banks of
Naples during the eighteenth century suggests a maximum age of , clearly
indicating a desire to train young men in the ways of the bank (Avallone
, p. ). This system was also characteristic of more recent banking recruit-
ment even in environments, such as Australia, where suitable labour was in very
short supply (Seltzer and Simons , p. ).
Although the diversity in parental occupations noted above is also reflected in the
occupations of candidates, we do find a large concentration of applicants from other
banking houses or what might be termed complementary occupations. As Table 
shows, around  per cent of applicants were working as clerks or bookkeepers, in
counting houses, other banking houses or in the law, insurance or education or
25 BEA, M/,  Jun. .
26 BEA, M/,  Mar. .
27 BEA, M/,  Jul. .
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government offices such as the Customs House or the Excise Office. These occupa-
tions offered the potential for the acquisition of transferable skills that might have been
an advantage for those applying to the Bank, but one man had gained skills that were
clearly a concern to the committee. Charles Marcuard had been employed for five
years as an engraver, thus having acquired one of the key skills of a banknote
Table 5. Applicant’s occupation at time of interview
Occupation Occupation Occupation
Clerk  Engraver  Draper 
Unemployed  Haberdasher  Dyer 
Unknown or unclear  Hat maker  East India House 
Counting house  In school  Excise Office 
Banking  Ironmonger  Flatting mills 
With his father/brother  Japaner  Glass cutter 
Bookkeeper  Jeweller  Hardwareman 
Schoolmaster/tutor  Oilman  Inn-keeper 
Legal profession  Ribbon warehouse  Lace maker 
Merchant  Shopkeeper  Landscape painter 
Farming  Silk trade  Mealman 
Grocer  Silversmith  Musician 
Insurance  Stationer  Oilman 
Agent  Surveyor  Orchell maker 
Linen draper  Tanner  Packer 
Conveyancer  Upholsterer  Pay master 
Seaman  Writer  Plasterer 
Stockbroker  Architect  Plate manufacturers 
Wine trade  Baker  Plumber 
Bookseller  Blanket dealer  Potter 
Cloth worker  Bookbinder  Sealing wax manufacturer 
Coal trade  Brass founder  Ship chandler 
Watchmaker  Brewer  Soap manufacturer 
Optician  Brushmaker  Sugar refiner 
Printer  Cabinet maker  Tailor 
Warehouseman  Cashier  Tallow chandler 
Apothecary  Chemist  Tea broker 
Artist  Cloth dresser  Tobacconist 
Auctioneer  Coachmaker  Trunk maker 
Carpenter  Confectioner  Umbrella maker 
Compositor  Currier  Waterworks 
Corn merchant  Custom house  Wheelwright 
Customs officer  Debt collector  Woollen trade 
Source: BEA, M/–, passim.
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forger. Marcuard’s application was referred to the Court of Directors before being
accepted.28
The Bank did also draw in a large number of applicants with apparently no relevant
previous work experience. Richard Hughes, for example, was a landscape painter at
the time of his application.29 James Allanson from Knaresborough, north Yorkshire,
was the son of a farmer and was noted to be living and working with Mr Tucker and
Co., plate manufacturers.30 John Chappell had been brought up to be a stationer with
his father and apparently had never been away from his family.31 Hughes, Allanson
and Chappell were all regarded as having promising qualities. However, John
Carman, an umbrella maker, was found to have only ‘indifferent’ handwriting and
his application was rejected.32
Men with no relevant work experience sometimes received training or moved into
jobs that would allow them to pick up banking-related skills before applying to the
Bank. Thus, Andrew Fenoulhet had been a hatter and hosier but had received
three months training in accounts and writing and declared his intention to continue
that training in the evenings after his working day was finished.33 Robert Dodge
Barton had been a tallow chandler but hadmore recently become a clerk in his brother’s
wine merchants. He was judged to be able to write well but was not ‘ready’ with
accounts.34 Charles Parry, a hatter, was rejected at his first attempt to enter the
Bank in June  and subsequently sought employment writing out and settling
accounts. By his second interview, his handwriting was improved.35 Other men
tried to emphasise relevant transferable skills, such as Thomas Reynolds who,
although employed as a haberdasher, claimed to spend much of his time ‘copying
out manuscripts’.36
Adding to the list of those whose previous work experience was not always useful
to the Bank were a significant number of men whowere either unemployed or seem-
ingly underemployed at the time of their application. There is no evidence that the
Bank disadvantaged unemployed applicants. Indeed, around  per cent of applicants
claimed to be unemployed at the time of interview. Such was the case for George
Baldwin, aged , who had been out of work for around six months at the time of
his application.37 Samuel Rickards, aged , had been two years in town and was
still not in employment.38
28 BEA, M/,  Aug. .
29 BEA, M/,  Sep. .
30 Ibid.
31 BEA, M/,  Oct. .
32 BEA, M/,  May .
33 BEA, M/,  Jul. .
34 BEA, M/  Jun. .
35 BEA, M/,  Jun. ;  Mar. .
36 BEA, M/,  Jun. .
37 BEA, M/,  Jun. 
38 BEA, M/,  Mar. .
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Some of the interviews with unemployed men also point to the precariousness of
business life during the early nineteenth century. Hence Charles Castleman had been
apprenticed to a wine merchant whose business had failed. Castleman had been
unable to find full employment since and was currently occupied in keeping the
books for his uncle, a bricklayer.39 Charles was not the only applicant to hint at under-
employment. Around  per cent of applicants claimed to have been employed in
keeping their father’s or brother’s books or assisting in a relative’s business in some
other way. Others were just noted to have been with their father since leaving
school. Of course, we cannot be clear about what these men were doing; it may
be that they were indeed fully employed in the family business. Yet, if so, and if oper-
ating as a valuable member of a family business, it seems unlikely that they would be
seeking alternative employment.
Early nineteenth-century unemployment rates are notoriously difficult to measure
and what calculations have been done relate to labouring and agricultural employ-
ment (Feinstein , p. ; Voth , p. ). These calculations, however,
suggest an unemployment rate of around  per cent during the early years of the nine-
teenth century and prior to the mass demobilisation that took place at the end of the
NapoleonicWars. This means that the Bank’s records indicate unemployment among
the higher artisanal occupations and middling sorts was much higher than the norm.
Of course, the evidence is hardly conclusive and it might point to no more than a
shifting pattern of working for the middling sorts, away from predominant self-
employment or semi-employment in a family business towards full-time employ-
ment in the service of another. There is insufficient evidence here to speculate
further but one thing is clear: high unemployment rates did not automatically
bring the Bank a cheap labour force of skilled workers.
IV
The result of the Bank’s tests confirm that the skills it required were possessed by rela-
tively few. As noted above, the Bank imposed three tests on candidates: a test of their
handwriting, a test of their ability with accounts and a test of their ability to ‘tell’
money. The specifics of the tests have not been preserved but we can speculate that
good penmanship required a neat legible hand, the ability to write without leaving
blots on the paper, and the ability to copy without error. Indeed, errors were to be
avoided at all costs because of the potential association of the erasure of errors with
fraud (Jeacle , p. ). Speed was also important and the committees often
praised expeditious hands. With regard to accounts, candidates had to be competent
in simple mathematics and to understand double-entry bookkeeping. The Bank’s test,
however, appears to have involved the addition of columns of figures. In the handling
of money, candidates had to be able to recognise numerous different forms of specie
and notes and understand their value. Thus the test of ability with money appears to
39 BEA, M/,  Jun. .
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have consisted of a requirement to compute a number of ‘parcels’ of cash and it was
measured by speed, in number of minutes taken, and accuracy by number of parcels
computed inaccurately.
The handwriting and accounting tests were measured only by speed, in number of
minutes taken to complete the tests, and the committees recorded a subjective
comment on accuracy or quality of the work. The test results reveal considerable vari-
ation in the ability of candidates. Among candidates with no familial connection to
the Bank, time taken to complete the handwriting test ranged from  to 
minutes and time taken to complete the addition test ranged from three to 
minutes. With regard to the test of telling money, times taken ranged from  to
 minutes and only . per cent of candidates ( out of the  tests that can be
traced) managed to complete the tests without error. The sons of clerks who, it
might be argued, with advice from their fathers had the opportunity to make a
more effective preparation for the tests, did little better. Amongst the sons, time
taken to complete the handwriting test ranged from  to minutes and to complete
the addition test from two to  minutes. The time taken to complete the tests of
telling money ranged between  and  minutes and only two men, . per cent
of the total number of sons of clerks, managed to calculate the parcels without error.
The test of telling money offers a fascinating insight into the difficulties of dealing
with the monetary environment of the late eighteenth century which encompassed
not just current English coin but some much older and a great deal of foreign coin as
well as a wide variety of banknotes. Even accounting for this and the nervousness of
candidates, the very low percentage of men who were able to pass the test without
error is significant. Moreover, as Figure  shows, the results were not skewed by a
few very poor performances, in fact performances were highly variable and, in par-
ticular, show that the ideal of the ‘fast and accurate’ cashier was not available to the
Bank at point of entry. Indeed, a closer examination of those men who completed
the test without making any errors shows that the average time taken to complete
the test was . minutes, indicating that steadiness rather than expedition was the
key to accuracy for those men. They were equally steady in their other tests. The
average time taken by them to complete the writing test was . minutes and
the average time taken to complete the addition test was . minutes. Samuel
Field was quick, completing the writing test in  minutes and the addition test in
five but was judged by the committee to be ‘not ready’ with regard to addition, a
phrase that seemed to indicate inaccuracy.40 Only eight men out of this group
received unequivocally positive remarks from the committees.
Nonetheless, if we regard the  men who managed to complete the tests with
money without error as being amongst the most highly skilled that the Bank could
acquire, it is possible to draw some conclusions about how these skills were acquired.
It is notable, for example, that the average age amongst this group was with over 
per cent of the group being over the age of , thus suggesting that long work
40 BEA, M/,  Mar. .
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experience was one of the keys to skill acquisition. Equally, the majority of this group
were working at the time of interview in banking or similar occupations. Only six out
of the  members of this group whose previous occupation was recorded were
engaged in seemingly non-compatible work, this included a farmer, a baker, and
oyster netter, the superintendent at St John’s chapel and -year-old John William
Mackintosh who was still in school.
As shown in Table , extending such assumptions to the entire cohort of applicants
tends to support the finding that performance improved with the age, and arguably
the experience, of the candidate. There were nonetheless no very significant differ-
ences in performance. Table  also confirms that, while the sons of former and existing
clerks in the – age bracket performed slightly better at addition and telling
money, the Bank in fact derived no particular advantage from employing men
with a familial connection to the Bank. The clerical class, therefore, did not
provide a ready-made next generation of workers.
Table  shows performance in the Bank’s tests grouped by the previous work
experience of the applicants. Occupations were coded as providing or not providing
relevant, office-based, skills, such as work in banking, in counting houses, as clerks, in
insurance, government offices and schooling. Men were coded as unemployed or
underemployed if they admitted to being out of work at the time of interview,
said that they were working intermittently or just described themselves as being
‘with their father’. The results displayed in Table  show that, while once again the
differences were not great, men with previous relevant work experience could
Figure . Results of tests of telling money
Source: BEA, M/; M/, passim.
Larger bubbles represent more than one result.
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Table 6. Performance in Bank’s tests measured by age of applicants
Non-sons Sons
Writing test
(avg no. of
mins)
Addition test
(avg no. of
mins)
Test of telling
money (avg no.
of mins)
Errors made
(average)
Writing test
(avg no. of
mins)
Addition test
(avg no. of
mins)
Test of telling
money (avg no.
of mins)
Errors made
(average)
Age of applicant
– . . . . . . . .
– . . . . . . . .
– . . . .
Source: BEA, M/, Drawing Office, candidates’ examination book; M/, Tellers’ Office, candidates’ examination book; M/,
Secretary’s Department: candidates for election, –, passim.
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Table 7. Performance in Bank’s tests measured by previous experience of applicants
Non-sons Sons
Writing test
(avg no. of
mins)
Addition test
(avg no. of
mins)
Test of
telling
money (avg
no. of mins)
Errors
made
(average)
Writing test
(avg no. of
mins)
Addition test
(avg no. of
mins)
Test of
telling
money (avg
no. of mins)
Errors
made
(average)
Applicant’s experience
In relevant work . . . . . . . .
In non-relevant work . . . . . .  .
Un- or underemployed . . . .   . .
Source: BEA, M/; M/; M/, passim.
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outperform those who were unemployed or in employed in other sectors of the
economy in writing and in addition. The test of telling money revealed somewhat
different results: men working in non-relevant occupations did slightly better than
those in office-based work. Here we may assume that men working in the retail
sector or small-scale manufacturing might have come into contact with coin and
notes more regularly than men undertaking some office-based roles. Again,
though, the dominant finding is that there was no significant advantage to the
Bank in seeking out men with office-based work experience.
The results of the Bank’s tests confirm the white-collar skills shortage which has
been observed in the work of other scholars. This was a shortage that apparently per-
sisted into the middle of the nineteenth century (Boot , p. ; Sayers  p.
). Especially during the period from  to  this presented a particular
problem for the Bank. As we have noted its business was expanding rapidly and
thus it had to recruit large numbers of clerks quickly. It, therefore, had to rely on strat-
egies other than the location of skilled recruits to preserve its business.
V
The foregoing discussion has established that the Bank’s ability to copewith the strains
created by the Napoleonic Wars did not originate in the skills of its entry-level clerks.
Arguably, therefore, we must consider how the Bank set about transforming a set of
applicants, many of whom had no clear natural aptitudewith accounts or money, into
an effective workforce. Although no details of the Bank’s training systems can be
traced, it is possible to speculate on several factors that might have allowed the insti-
tution effectively to manage its workforce: the creation of an internal labour market,
the establishment of systems to monitor staff and encourage diligence and the special-
isation of the Bank’s functions.
An internal labour market is characterised by limited points of entry into employ-
ment, internal promotion to fill senior positions, career longevity and transparent pay
practices (Seltzer ). The Bank of England displayed all these characteristics:
throughout its early history it recruited only at entry level and trained men on the
job, apparently, as and when needs required. Senior men had all worked their way
up through the ranks and were paid based onmerit and seniority. Arguably an internal
labour market offered the Bank several advantages in dealing with an entry-level
workforce with questionable skills. First, it meant the creation of a middle and
senior rank of men with long experience of the Bank’s procedures and processes
who were ready and available to supervise and train newcomers. Although somewhat
anecdotal, the career trajectory of MrWalsh of the  per cent Consols office reported
to a Committee of Inspection in  is instructive. He told the Committee:
That he had been  years in the Bank, & for the last  years one of the  Chief Clerks of this
Office, being appointed Assistant to Mr Miller & Mr Vickery. That when he first came into
the Bank, he was placed in the department of the Chief Cashier where he went through the
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Offices of OutTeller & InTeller, & was some time at one of the Cash books & assisted in the
Bullion Office at the time of taking in the deficient Gold Coin; he was afterwards removed
into the Accountants Office, which he went through; & from thence to the  P Ct
Consols, where he has seen every part of the business before he was appointed one of the
Chief Clerks.41
Such men acquired a deep knowledge and skill set that they would have been able to
pass on to more junior members of staff.
Next, the creation of an internal labour market meant that the Bank could avoid a
rising premium for buying in skills throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centur-
ies. It could keep its junior members of staff relatively low-waged and reward the
acquisition of skills and seniority. Finally, the reward of skill acquisition and seniority,
rather than just ability, is now regarded as an important factor in maintaining the
morale of employees and ensuring effort over the lifetime of a career (Seltzer and
Simons , p. ). The Bank did indeed tend to retain its workers, many of
whom had very long careers within the institution. Thus, the Bank reaped the ben-
efits of its investment in its clerks. For the clerks, on the other hand, rewards could be
slow to materialise implying that that the Bank tended to attract workers willing to
take a long-term view on the returns for their labour.
The second factor that allowed the Bank to operate with underskilled entry-level
workers was systems of monitoring and reward and punishment to encourage loyalty
and diligence. The development of a level of intermediate management has been
noted above. While the chief accountant and chief cashier, answering directly to
the Court of Directors, had overall responsibility for work at the Bank, each office
appointed a senior man and often supervisors who were responsible for the day-to-
day management of the offices. In addition, periodically from the s, the Bank
appointed its directors to Committees of Inspection whose role was to examine the
operation of the Bank and the fitness of its staff. From  three permanent commit-
tees were established having oversight of the Stock Offices, the Printing and Bank
Notes Offices and the Cash Offices respectively. Although the effectiveness of
these modes of oversight cannot be measured, it is clear that the committees operated
to expose the Bank’s systems and its staff to regular scrutiny and that swift response to
the discovery of serious failings was expected.
At an individual level, the Bank operated systems of rewards and punishment for its
staff. Clerks could be made financially responsible for errors that led to losses for the
Bank. Each clerk was also expected to provide the Bankwith personal security starting
at £ for junior clerks and rising to a maximum of £, depending on respon-
sibility. The Bank was diligent both in maintaining up-to-date records for guarantors
and pursuing compensation in the event of significant losses resulting from errors or
41 BEA, M/, Secretary’s Department: Committee of Inspection Minutes, Nov.  – Mar.
, fo. .
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dishonesty (Acres , I, p. ). On the other hand, bonuses were paid to reward
prompt and regular attendance, although pay was withheld to punish absence. In
some offices ‘overtime’ was paid on a piecework basis. Thus in the Discount
Office clerks were allowed s d for every additional  bills posted after their
expected daily work was completed (Acres , II, p. ). Efficient working was,
therefore, encouraged by financial reward.
The third factor that allowed the Bank to compensate for the lack of skills available
at entry level was the specialisation of its functions. As in the Discount Office, most
men working at the Bank at junior levels spent their days engaged in mundane and
repetitive work designed to be coordinated with other members of individual
offices. While the language of skills has been used throughout the discussion so far,
in fact, by most definitions, work at the Bank was not particularly skilled. In this
respect, Green’s articulation of the complexities of defining skilled work in the
modern economy is illuminating. It indicates that skill should encompass the negoti-
ation of significant complexity or the application of thought, discernment and inde-
pendent decision-making (Green , pp. –). Such functions would have been
required of relatively few roles at the early nineteenth-century Bank of England.
Indeed, arguably what can be observed is a process of deskilling, such as apparently
occurred during industrialisation. In manufacturing, dividing processes into specia-
lised steps meant considerably less investment in skill acquisition (Berg ; Mitch
, p. ). Perhaps the same was true of work in the nineteenth-century Bank
of England.
VI
This study of the labour force available to the Bank of England at the start of the nine-
teenth century shows that there was a clear over-supply of labour but no clerical class
from which the Bank could draw its candidates for employment and certainly no
over-supply of skills. This finding is consistent with broader studies of the labour
force in industrialising Britain, which although disagreeing about the size of the
gap, still indicates a gap which points to underinvestment in human capital (Mitch
, pp. –). This serious mismatch between the needs of the employer and
the skills of the potential workforce meant that there was a need for diligence in
the training and monitoring of new staff and a significant investment in human
capital made by the Bank itself. However, it is probable that it was not an investment
in broad training but rather a process of deskilling through the specialisation of the
Bank’s functions that allowed it to operate with relatively few workers who might
have been defined as truly skilled.
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